THE WEST IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
INDIFFERENCE OR STUPIDITY?
By Kelly Haston, Foothill College
From the Internet Book, Eastern
Europe
The role of the West in the former Yugoslavia, an area torn apart by a war for several years, has been called into question more and more as we see the results of its handling, (or lack of handling), of the situation. By evaluating what the West did do, or what it should have done, we may be able to determine where mistakes were made and take away valuable lessons in policy and decision making for the future. I will also venture a prediction of the situation in which the countries in the area formerly know as Yugoslavia may find themselves at the turn of the century.
The fact that the Western countries were so slow to react to the situation in the former Yugoslavia may have happened for many reasons. A preoccupation with Russia's turn towards democracy, or as others have claimed, the lack of financial and political clout of this area, had many perceiving it as a relatively unimportant issue. The issues and problems of a small country may have seemed like small potatoes to the large powers. Whatever the reasons, the Western countries really dropped the ball on this one. If they had been watching, even taking a small interest in the burgeoning affairs of this area, they may have been able to step in before the situation ran out of control. Instead of becoming peace keepers they might have become worthy helpers to the new countries of the former Yugoslavia, as they made their way towards a democratic society in their post-communist years.
Instead, as the problem escalated, the West turned a blind eye, watching as nationalistic feelings surged and Serbia started to use the former Yugoslav army to control, and aggress, against the republics that were declaring their independence. Had the Western countries stepped in when Serbia initially attacked Slovenia and given a sign that this type of aggression was unacceptable, they might have halted the violence before it really started. Instead they claimed that it was a civil war for the countries involved to work out, and not their concern.
Finally, in September of 1991, responding to the growth from skirmishes to all out war between Serbia and Croatia, the western-controlled United Nations imposed an arms embargo on all the countries of the former Yugoslavia. As David Rohde points out in End Game, it was put there to, "theoretically lessen fighting. But the embargo simply locked into place the huge military advantage enjoyed by the Serbs, the largest group in the former Yugoslavia, who controlled the Yugoslav National Army and its vast stockpile of ammunition." By its actions, which left the Serbs in a position of superiority, the UN had actually created a further chance of war. The situation worsened and the UN sent peacekeeping troops to try to control the violence. But the lateness of the move and the ineffectual threats of the UN did very little to change the war.
What followed was a series of propositions by the international mediators, mostly attempting to find a solution by dividing Bosnia along ethnic lines. These attempts were unsuccessful, and led to NATO military intervention as the war continued, with atrocities on all sides becoming widespread and the UN still unable to stop them. NATO's presence continued to grow into 1995 until the Western powers forced the warring parties to the peace table in Dayton, Ohio.
The Dayton peace talks, and the accords that came out of it are highly controversial. Perhaps if the Western countries had acted earlier they would not have had to use the high handed tactics of forcing the warring countries to the peace table. But an agreement was reached, with NATO replacing the UN as the peace keepers. Samuel Berger, national security adviser, believes that the "choices made at...Dayton--are producing real, positive change in Bosnia. Dayton has kept the guns silent and Bosnia intact, and the work of rebuilding, uneven as it is, is moving forward." But he also claims that the gains are not definite, that without the help of the West, it could reverse quickly. With the current talk of pulling out, will the West revert back to its previous stance of indifference? If so, what will be learned from any of this mess?
The lessons that the West should learn from the past and current situation in the former Yugoslavia are plentiful. History has shown us that indifference to the conflicts of smaller nations generally creates a situation that grows out of control and becomes a larger problem. The larger scenario draws in just the groups that tried to ignore it, at a cost higher in life, time, and money than would have originally been the case. As nations become more closely tied, which is now happening in our "global village," the West must learn that a policy of appeasement or ignorant indifference will not only be harmful to its interests but to its moral fiber.
The moral lesson is that people died, or had horrible atrocities executed upon them, when the West could have averted the situation. The international community as a whole needs to learn that it can not stand by while populations are being threatened by an aggressor, and while ethnic cleansing, and genocidal rape is taking place. Until this is learned, the morality of every nation is in question.
I believe that the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia holds two possible outcomes. One with the West's help, and one without.
If the West, with NATO as its peace keepers, continues its presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then I predict a continuation of the slow, painful growth towards a democratic society. It will be much slower than their neighbors of the former Soviet bloc, but I believe it will happen. Samuel Berger said of the current situation in Bosnia, "We see continued difficulties and recalcitrance, but we also see progress that is making a real difference in the lives of the Bosnian people." As long as the Bosnians continue to see this improvement, it will give them the incentive to work out their differences.
By November of 1999, with continued Western presence, I expect to see the majority of the refugees returned, and a start to their reintegration. The economy will still be very weak, but unemployment will be going down. Undoubtedly, with a continuing peace I fully expect tourism from the West to increase, helping the economy. Without the continuing presence of the peace keeping forces, I believe that Bosnia will not exist in its present form in 1999. It will have been carved up by the other factions, which will surely return to war upon the West's departure.
Serbia is harder to predict, but I believe that with continued pressure from the West, and its own people, Serbian aggression may become a thing of the past. In 1999 I hope to see a move towards a true democracy, like the students in Belgrade are asking for. I believe that to get to this point, Serbia will have to give up more of their war criminals and confront their role and responsibility in the war. With continued Western influence and help the people should see that there is a better way and I think that the current power base will collapse. It may need a bit of a shove. Without a Western presence to keep peace while the people sort themselves out, recover from the horror and discover the possibilities of a different type of society, I believe Serbia will fall further under the power of her more aggressive politicians, and rekindle the war.
The role of the West in the former Yugoslavia since 1990 started with a very poor showing. For far too long the West ignored the situation, letting it escalate into a horrendous war. When it finally did make an effort , it made many mistakes. The solution now at hand is a second rate one, like a rubber dingy that gets patched in the water when its needed, not on land when it should have been done, but it is slowly working. With a continued Western presence the countries of the former Yugoslavia will hopefully recover.
December 1997
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Europe